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Case No. 970415-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Since the state filed its Brief of Appellee in the above-
entitled matter, this Court has issued a decision in State v. 
Labrum, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App. 1998) ("Labrum III") ,x 
that impacts resolution of many issues raised on appeal in this 
case. For that reason, in this reply brief Appellant Christopher 
Cheeney has addressed the Labrum III decision first. (See Point 
I, infra.) In order to facilitate discussion of that case, 
Cheeney has taken the arguments out of their original order as 
set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, and he has con-
solidated discussion of several points affected by the decision. 
By way of background on the issues raised in the opening 
Brief of Appellant and set forth in the Brief of Appellee, 
Cheeney has asked this Court to strike Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
203.1 (1995) (the "gang enhancement statute")2 as 
unconstitutional for several reasons: 
1
 This Court's first decision is found at State v. Labrum, 
881 P.2d 900 (Utah App. 1994) ("Labrum I"). That decision was 
vacated and remanded by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
Labrum, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996) ("Labrum II"). A petition for 
rehearing is pending in Labrum III in this Court. 
2
 The Utah Supreme Court recognized that Section 76-3-203.1 
is "commonly known as the 'gang enhancement7 provision." State v, 
Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994). 
(1) Section 76-3-203.1 fails to specify the standard appli-
cable to the state in proving the statutory elements. Cheeney has 
argued the statute is vague under a due process analysis (Brief 
of Appellant, Point III. at 30), and lends itself to discrimina-
tory application (id., Point V. at 36). In addition, it violates 
Cheeney7s right to have the state prove the statutory elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt (id., Points II.B. at 27; IV. at 33). 
In response to Cheeney's arguments, the state asserts that 
because § 76-3-203.1 is a sentencing provision, the state is held 
to establishing the statutory elements by a preponderance of the 
evidence. According to the state, Cheeney is not entitled to have 
the state prove the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. (State's 
Brief, Points II.B. at 28; III. at 31; IV. at 35; V. at 37.) 
Labrum III resolves those issues on appeal. It specifies 
that the state must prove the elements set forth in § 76-3-203.1 
beyond a reasonable doubt before the trial court may impose the 
enhancement against defendant. Labrum III, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
37. As set forth herein at Point I, the trial court refused to 
hold the state to the reasonable-doubt standard under § 76-3-
203.1. Thus, this Court should reverse imposition of the 
enhancements against Cheeney and remand the case so that the 
trial court may hold the state to the reasonable-doubt standard 
in proving the statutory elements. 
(2) The statute denies Cheeney's right to have a jury 
determine facts that traditionally are elements of a criminal 
offense (Brief of Appellant, Points I. at 8; II.C. at 28). Since 
2 
State v. Ramirez, 948 P.2d 375 (Utah App. 1997), rejects that 
argument, it should be overruled as incorrect. 
In response to Cheeney's position, the state asserts that 
Ramirez is persuasive notwithstanding its lack of legal analysis. 
(State's Brief, Point I. at 7.) 
As further set forth herein at Point II, Cheeney maintains 
that Ramirez fails to weigh important considerations identified 
in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), and should be 
overruled. 
(3) The statute punishes Cheeney for the mental culpability 
of others in violation of fundamental fairness and due process 
considerations (Brief of Appellant, Points II.A. at 23; IV. at 
33). In response to those arguments, the state claims Cheeney 
misapprehends the elements that must be proved under the statute. 
(State's Brief, Point II.A. at 25.) 
The state's claim disregards the Utah Supreme Court's 
language in State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994), as 
further set forth herein at Point III, infra. This Court should 
strike the statute as unconstitutional. 
(4) Finally, the state has raised procedural arguments in 
response to certain constitutional claims. Those arguments lack 
merit as set forth herein at Point IV, infra. 
POINT I. IN RESPONSE TO THE STATE'S POINTS H.B, f III,, 
IV., AND V,, THIS COURT'S DECISION IN LABRUM III COMPELS 
REVERSAL OF THE ENHANCEMENTS IN THIS CASE AND REMAND IN 
ORDER THAT THE TRIAL COURT MAY CORRECT AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE. 
In the trial court, Cheeney argued that Section 76-3-203.1 
was unconstitutional for failing to specify the burden of proof 
3 
applicable to the state in establishing imposition of the en-
hancements, and/or that the state must be held to the reasonable-
doubt standard in proving the statutory elements. (R. 46-47; 193; 
202.) The prosecutor disagreed and claimed the state was "not 
bound to any standard of proof [under § 76-3-203.1. . . . If] the 
state must prove that defendant acted in concert with two or more 
persons for enhancement purposes, then the appropriate standard 
is by a preponderance of the evidence." (R. 66.) 
The trial court agreed with the state, and rejected 
Cheeney's arguments "for the reasons specified in the [state's] 
memorandum." (R. 71, 89.) Thereafter, rather than proceed to a 
sentencing hearing where the state "would not be bound to any 
standard of proof," or would be bound only to the preponderance-
of-evidence standard, Cheeney entered into a conditional guilty 
plea on the statutory elements. (R. 284:4-6; 27-37.) 
Cheeney's plea was conditioned on his success in challenging 
the trial court's ruling and the constitutionality of § 76-3-
203.1. Cheeney maintains that if this Court declines to strike § 
76-3-203.1 as unconstitutional, Labrum III provides Cheeney with 
a remedy in this case, as set forth below. 
A. LABRUM III IDENTIFIED THE STANDARD APPLICABLE TO THE 
STATE IN PROVING SECTION 76-3-203.1 ELEMENTS. 
In Labrum III, this Court considered the sufficiency of the 
evidence presented by the state in support of imposing an en-
hancement under § 76-3-203.1. To reiterate, § 76-3-203.1 provides 
that a person who commits a certain enumerated offense "in con-
cert" with "two or more other persons" is subject to an enhanced 
4 
penalty. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (1) (a) and (b) (1995). The 
statute defines "in concert" by referencing the accomplice 
liability statute, Utah Code Ann. 76-2-202 (1995). Id. 
In Labrum III, this Court recognized that reference in the 
gang enhancement statute to § 76-2-202 requires proof that the 
"other persons" acted with a criminal "mental state" and they 
directly committed or solicited, requested, commanded, 
encouraged, or aided in the commission of the offense at issue. 
Labrum III, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37. That is, reference to § 
76-2-2 02 mandates that to sustain the enhancement, the state must 
prove under the reasonable-doubt standard that "other persons" 
had a criminal mental state and participated in the offense "in 
one of the ways listed" in the statute. 
[F]or a person to be "criminally liable" under section 76-2-
202, the State must prove each element of the offense 
[against the other persons] beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Accordingly, because Behunin did not directly commit the 
shooting, to impose the group crime enhancement upon Labrum, 
the evidence had to show -- beyond a reasonable doubt --
that Behunin solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or 
intentionally aided Labrum and/or Mills in committing the 
shooting. The sentencing court's findings are insufficient 
to satisfy this standard. 
Labrum III, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37.3 "The quality of [the 
involvement of the two or more other persons] must rise to the 
level of participation described in section 76-2-202, they must 
3
 The standard identified in Labrum III is consistent with 
Utah law. The elements set forth in § 76-2-202 are traditional 
elements of a criminal offense. See State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 
1052, 1056 (Utah 1985); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 84-85 (Utah 
App. 1990), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). Thus, 
defendant is entitled to a jury trial on the elements and proof 
of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Smith, 706 P.2d at 
1056 (jury required to determine § 76-2-202 elements). 
5 
possess a sufficiently culpable mental state, and the prosecution 
must prove the foregoing beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. 
The state suggests that imposition of the reasonable-doubt 
standard is in conflict with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 450. (State's Brief at 20.) That is 
incorrect. In Alvarez, the court did not discuss the standard of 
proof applicable under § 76-3-203.1. Rather, the court 
recognized that for the gang enhancement statute to apply, the 
state was not required to prove that the two or more other 
persons had the same criminal mental state as defendant. Id. at 
461. Alvarez is not relevant to this issue. 
By contrast Labrum III articulated that the state must prove 
§ 76-3-203.1 elements under the reasonable-doubt standard. 
Labrum III applies here. 
B. LABRUM III RESOLVES ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL. 
1. In Response to the State's Point II.B., Labrum III 
Resolves the Issue. 
On appeal, Cheeney has argued that § 76-3-203.1 is uncon-
stitutional because it fails on its face to require the state to 
prove the statutory elements beyond a reasonable doubt (Brief of 
Appellant, Point IIrB. at 27). The state has responded that the 
reasonable-doubt standard is inapplicable here. (See State's 
Brief at 28-29: " [B]ecause section 76-3-203.2 is a sentencing 
statute, the trial court is not required to make findings beyond 
a reasonable doubt.") This Court's decision in Labrum III imposes 
the reasonable-doubt standard, thereby resolving the issue. 
Although Labrum III does not compel this Court to reverse 
6 
Cheeney's case on the grounds that the statute is 
unconstitutional, remand nevertheless is required. Where the 
trial court in Cheeney's case rejected the reasonable-doubt 
standard, its ruling was legally incorrect. 
Rule 22(e), Utah R. Crim. P., allows the trial court "to 
correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner, at any time." Cheeney is entitled to an order reversing 
imposition of the enhancements in this case and remanding the 
matter to the trial court for resentencing, where the state will 
be required to prove the elements of § 76-3-203.1 beyond a 
reasonable doubt to sustain imposition of the enhancements. 
2. In Response to the State's Points III. A. 3. and V. , 
Labrum III Resolves the Issues. 
At Points III. and V.B. of the opening Brief of Appellant, 
Cheeney argued, among other things, that the legislature's 
failure to specify the burden of proof applicable to the state in 
establishing § 76-3-203.1 elements rendered the statute 
unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process provisions, 
and susceptible to discriminatory application in violation of the 
Equal Protection provision of the federal constitution, and the 
Uniform Operation of the Laws provision of the state 
constitution. (Brief of Appellant, Points III. at 30; V. at 36.) 
The state disagreed. (State's Brief, Point III.A.3.; Point V. at 
p. 40: "[S]ection 76-3-203.1 ... implicitly provides that the 
court make a finding based on a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant acted 'in concert with two or more persons.'") 
Labrum III in part resolves the constitutional issues 
7 
identified in Points III. and V.B. of Cheeney's Brief of 
Appellant by articulating that the reasonable-doubt standard is 
applicable to the state in proving § 76-3-203.1 elements. See 
State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989) ("[T]his Court has a 
duty to construe a statute whenever possible so as to ... avoid 
and/or save it from constitutional conflicts or infirmities"); 
see also State v. Lindauist, 674 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1983) . 
Since the trial court rejected imposition of the reasonable-
doubt standard under § 76-3-203.1, the state was not held to that 
burden of proof. Rather than proceed with the matter under such 
conditions, Cheeney conditionally pled to the enhancements in 
order to challenge the trial court's ruling. Inasmuch as the 
trial court made a legally incorrect ruling in the matter, en-
hancement findings were not properly made in this case. The en-
hancements should be reversed and remanded to correct an illegal 
sentence. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (1998); see Point I.B.I, supra. 
The state should be held in the trial court to proving § 76-
3-203.1 elements "beyond a reasonable doubt" to sustain imposi-
tion of the enhancements, as Cheeney argued in the court below. 
3. In Response to the State's Point IV., Labrum III Imposes 
the Standard Urged by Cheeney. 
At Point IV of the opening Brief of Appellant, Cheeney 
argued that in connection with sentencing proceedings under § 76-
3-203.1, defendant is entitled to have the state prove the 
statutory elements "beyond a reasonable doubt," as well as to 
other due process protections. (Brief of Appellant at 34-36.) 
The state disagreed. (State's Brief, Point IV. at 35.) 
8 
Labrum III resolves the "reasonable-doubt" issue in 
Cheeney's favor. This Court stated that to impose the enhancement 
upon a defendant, the state's evidence "had to show -- beyond a 
reasonable doubt -- that [the third person] solicited, . . . or 
intentionally aided Labrum and/or [the second person] in 
committing the shooting." Labrum III, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37. 
Since the trial court rejected the reasonable-doubt standard in 
this case, the court's ruling was legally incorrect. The 
enhancements should be reversed and this case should be remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with Labrum III. 
POINT II, IN RESPONSE TO THE STATE'S POINT I,, RAMIREZ WAS 
WRONGLY DECIDED. 
In opposition to Cheeney's argument that this Court should 
overrule State v. Ramirez, 948 P.2d 375 (Utah App. 1997) (see 
Brief of Appellant, Point I. at 8), the state asserts that 
Ramirez is well-reasoned under McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 
79 (1986). (State's Brief, Point I at 12, 14.) Yet, the McMillan 
"analysis" does not occur in Ramirez, compelling the 
determination that Ramirez was incorrectly decided.4 
4
 The McMillan Court ruled that under the Pennsylvania 
sentencing law, defendant was not entitled to have "visible 
possession of a firearm" determined under the reasonable-doubt 
standard because that factor was not historically an element of a 
criminal offense. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 90. The Court also 
stated the following: "Having concluded that Pennsylvania may 
properly treat visible possession as a sentencing consideration 
and not an element of any offense, we need only note that there 
is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing." Id. at 93. 
In McMillan, the analysis relevant to determining the 
applicable standard of proof impacted the Court's ruling on the 
Sixth Amendment issue. Id. 
Since Labrum III resolves the standard-of-proof issue here, 
(continued...) 
9 
To reiterate, the United States Supreme Court in McMillan 
recognized that "there are constitutional limits to the State's 
power [in defining crimes and prescribing penalties]." McMillan, 
477 U.S. at 86. That is, when a statute denigrates elements of 
an offense to sentencing status, and specifies that the 
sentencing judge is the trier of fact, the legislature has 
crossed permissible constitutional lines. The analysis in 
McMillan begins with that principle.5 
Since this Court in Ramirez did not address that principle, 
it should be considered. Labrum III has taken the first step by 
defining elements that must be proved to sustain imposition of 
the enhancement. In Labrum III, this Court held that in order to 
impose the enhancement against defendant, the state must show 
criminal accomplice liability in the commission of the offense of 
two or more other persons. 
That is, the state at least must prove accomplice liability 
and every element of a criminal offense with respect to the two 
or more other persons. 
Accordingly, because [the third person] did not 
directly commit the shooting, to impose the group crime 
enhancement upon Labrum, the evidence had to show ... that 
[the third person] solicited, requested, commanded, 
4(...continued) 
Cheeney addresses the impact of the McMillan analysis only as it 
relates to his right to a jury and as set forth in Ramirez. 
5
 Incidentally, Cheeney does not assert that "McMillan is 
inapplicable" as claimed by the state. (State's Brief at 8.) 
Rather, Cheeney asserts that "circumspect consideration of Utah's 
statute under McMillan compels the determination that the 
sentencinQ label placed on the elements set forth in § 76-3-203.1 
must be rejected." (Brief of Appellant at 11 (emphasis added).) 
10 
encouraged, or intentionally aided Labrum and/or [the second 
person] in committing the shooting. The sentencing court's 
findings are insufficient to satisfy this standard. 
"Mere presence, or even prior knowledge, does not make 
one an accomplice when he neither advises, instigates, 
encourages, or assists in perpetration of the crime." Thus, 
[the third person's] presence during the shooting's planning 
and commission, whether he knew it was going to occur or 
not, was insufficient to impose criminal liability under 
section 76-2-202. Likewise, [the third person's] presence 
during Labrum's subsequent boasting, even if accompanied by 
some measure of strutting or posturing on [the third 
person's] part, and his burning the newspaper article, do 
not establish criminal liability under section 76-2-202. 
• * • 
Under this statute, it is not enough that others were 
present when the crime was committed. Rather, the quality of 
their involvement must rise to the level of participation 
described in section 76-2-202, they must possess a 
sufficiently culpable mental state. 
Labrum III, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37 (cites omitted). 
Once the elements to be proved under the sentencing 
provision are identified, McMillan asks whether such elements 
have "always been considered by sentencing courts to bear on 
punishment." McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89-90. In McMillan, the 
Court recognized that the "instrumentality used in committing the 
violent felony" was a traditional sentencing element. Id. In this 
case, the question is whether accomplice liability is a 
traditional sentencing factor.6 
Contrary to the state's assertions (see State's Brief at 16 
6
 Cheeney is not necessarily arguing that the legislature is 
allowed to identify only "simple facts as [] sentencing consider-
ations," as the state asserts. (State's Brief at 17, 18.) Cheeney 
maintains that the query concerns whether the legislature has 
taken traditional elements of an offense and relegated them to a 
sentencing status. Issues of criminal mental culpability tradi-
tionally are complicated, substantive elements based in circum-
stantial evidence. Such elements are afforded greater protection 
with the heightened burden of proof -- beyond a reasonable doubt. 
See Addinaton v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979). 
11 
& n. 67), § 76-2-202 elements traditionally are substantive 
7
 The state cites to case law in other jurisdictions to 
assert that courts traditionally consider "in concert" conduct or 
"accomplice" liability as sentencing factors. Those cases do not 
support the state's position for several reasons: 
(1) The courts did not consider accomplice or "in concert" 
liability as the relevant factor in imposing harsher sentences. 
In U.S. v. Sutherland, 890 F.2d 1042, 1043 (8th Cir. 1989), 
the trial court increased the sentence upon finding that "more 
than minimal planning" was involved in the commission of the 
offense. Defendant's planning consisted of organizing others to 
assist in the crime. The court was not concerned with accomplice 
liability, but with the level of planning involved. In People v. 
Mahone, 614 N.Y.S.2d 409, 411 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), the more 
severe sentence was imposed because of the defendant's 
"calculated scheme." "Accomplice" involvement was incidental. 
In Commonwealth v. Darden, 531 A.2d 1144 (Pa. Super. 1987), 
the court did not consider "accomplice liability" as an 
aggravating factor. Rather, the court focused on appellant's 
"victimization of a [defenseless] seventy-year-old woman" as 
"substantial." Id. 1149 (emphasis in original) & 1150. 
In State v. Dennis, 728 P.2d 1075, 1077-78 (Wash. App. 
1987), defendants gang raped the victim. The court looked to 
other jurisdictions, which upheld upward departures where a lone 
actor "alternately and forcibly penetrated [the victim] in the 
vagina and anus." The Dennis court found that subjecting the 
victim to multiple penetrations and two-forms of penetration 
justified imposition of exceptional sentences. Id. at 1078; see 
also Miller v. State, 866 P.2d 130 (Alaska 1994) (aggravating 
factor concerned "risk of imminent physical injury" in commission 
of offense to persons other than accomplices). 
(2) In the following cases, accomplice liability served as a 
basis for charging the defendants. Consequently, the accomplice 
liability elements were substantive elements of the criminal of-
fense, entitling defendant to a jury determination and proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt: Dixon v. State, 891 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Ark. 
1995); State v. Lanqford, 837 P.2d 1037 (Wash. App. Div. 3 1992), 
cert, denied, 510 U.S. 838 (1993). 
(3) In People v. Banks, 632 N.E.2d 257 (111. App. 1994), the 
trial court made a comment concerning defendant's and the 
victims7 membership in rival gangs. The appellate court found 
that the reference to the "rival gang situation" was not used "in 
aggravation at all" in determining sentencing. Id. at 265. 
(4) In DeGross v. State, 816 P.2d 212 (Alaska App. 1991), 
whether defendant "was the leader of a group of three or more 
persons (AS 12.55.-155 (c) (3)) , " id. at 216 n. 1 & 2, was consid-
ered as an aggravating sentencing factor. The court did not 
discuss application of that factor. The lack of discussion is not 
helpful here. 
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elements of an offense. See Smith, 706 P.2d at 1056 (requiring 
proof from state of each element set forth in § 76-2-202 to 
support conviction of offense); Webb, 790 P.2d at 84 (defendant 
properly convicted as accomplice where elements of § 76-2-202 are 
proved). Thus, under the McMillan analysis, relegation of the 
elements to sentencing status is impermissible. 
The state next argues that the Court in Ramirez "summarily 
adopted the analysis used in McMillan, and found that section 76-
3-203.1 correctly provided for a penalty enhancement." (State's 
Brief at 16.) However, as recognized by the state, the summary 
analysis in Ramirez simply constituted "observation" -- without 
more --of the following: (1) Pennsylvania could have defined 
underlying offenses to include visible possession as an element 
but it declined to do so; (2) "possession of a firearm under the 
Pennsylvania act is not an element of the proscribed offense," it 
is considered only after defendant has been found guilty of the 
underlying offense; (3) "the enhancement implies no presumption 
of guilt based on the facts of the case, nor is the prosecution 
relieved of its burden of proving the defendant guilty" on the 
underlying offense; (4) the enhancement does not extend 
incarceration beyond the maximum term provided for commission of 
the underlying felony, but rather it limits trial court 
discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already 
available; (5) "The statute gives no impression of having been 
tailored to permit the visible possession finding to be a tail 
which wags the dog of the substantive offense;" and (6) the 
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Pennsylvania legislature took a factor that was always considered 
by sentencing courts to bear on punishment -- the instrumentality 
used in committing a violent felony -- and dictated the precise 
weight to be given that factor. (State's Brief at 13-14.) 
According to the state, the above "observations" controvert 
the determination that facts set forth in Section 76-3-203.1 must 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (State's Brief at 12-16.) 
As set forth in Point I, supra, Labrum III resolves the issue 
concerning the applicable standard of proof here. Notwithstanding 
Labrum III, the state's "observations" are superficial, 
compelling reversal of Ramirez. See note 4, supra. 
With respect to the state's first observation, although the 
legislature may create an enhancement that requires proof of 
certain elements to the judge during sentencing, the fact that a 
legislature has created an enhancement does not immunize the 
legislation from being scrutinized by the courts for 
constitutional violations. "There are constitutional limits to 
the State's power [in defining crimes and prescribing 
penalties]." McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86. The state's observation 
(1) is not "analysis"; rather, it is an incomplete statement 
concerning legislative power. 
The state's observation (2) is actually a continuation of 
observation (1). According to the state, because the legislature 
has provided that the enhancement "operates only after the 
defendant has been found guilty" on the underlying offense, the 
enhancement is a sentencing provision. Observation (2) is not 
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"analysis." Rather, the analysis relevant to observations (1) 
and (2) concerns whether the "sentencing" elements are 
traditional sentencing considerations. As set forth in the 
opening Brief and herein, the elements identified at §§ 76-3-
203.1 and 76-2-202 are traditional elements of an offense. Under 
McMillan, Section 76-3-203.1 is unconstitutional. 
The state's observation (3) is irrelevant in light of Labrum 
III. The state is held to the reasonable-doubt standard in 
proving the § 76-3-203.1 elements. 
With respect to observation (4), Utah's sentencing scheme 
differs from the Pennsylvania sentencing scheme identified in 
McMillan. Under Pennsylvania law, the sentencing judge designated 
the number of years, within a specified range, that the accused 
would serve for committing a crime. That is, for a particular 
felony, the accused may be sentenced to serve 1 to 10 years. The 
judge specified the precise number of years to be served. 
Utah's sentencing laws operate in a different manner. Under 
Utah's structure, "a trial court has no discretion in sentencing 
a defendant to a certain number of years in prison." State v. 
Lipskv, 608 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1980). 
Under the Utah indeterminate sentencing laws, the minimum 
number of years triggers parole considerations. See State v. 
Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 244 (Utah 1995) (Board of Pardons makes 
reasoned decisions concerning incarceration beyond minimum 
sentence). Thus, the minimum number of years is more important to 
the defendant, while an increase in the maximum number of years 
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of incarceration may be inconsequential. See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-401 (Supp. 1997). 
Specifically, as pointed out in Cheeney's opening brief, if 
the minimum number of years to be served is increased, it is the 
equivalent of sentencing Cheeney to serve consecutive, numerous, 
additional sentences for second degree felony offenses. (Brief 
of Appellant, Point I.B.2. at 17); see also note 8, herein. The 
impact on sentencing is more profound than if Cheeney's maximum 
term had been increased, or Cheeney had been found guilty of 
committing several additional felony offenses, and sentenced to 
serve consecutive terms. 
By disregarding the distinctions between the Utah and 
Pennsylvania sentencing schemes, the state has promoted a 
meaningless analysis. Surely the United States Supreme Court did 
not expect that under McMillan, courts would simply inquire 
blindly as to whether the "maximum term" is extended. Such an 
analysis serves no purpose under the Utah scheme. The analytical 
question is whether the enhancement has a profound effect on the 
sentence. It does under the Utah structure. 
That brings us to observation (5). The state asserts the 
"tail-wagging-the-substantive-offense" metaphor means that the 
"Pennsylvania statute imposed no increase in the maximum 
penalty." (State's Brief at 17.) To the extent the metaphor 
carries such a meaning under McMillan, the state has failed to 
explain the metaphor's application in the context of the Utah 
sentencing structure. Here, Cheeney was sentenced for committing 
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second and third degree felony offenses. The trial court ordered 
him to serve the sentences concurrently. Under the Utah scheme, 
Cheeney may be eligible for parole after having served the 
aggregate of the minimum term on the two offenses: one year. 
However, imposition of the enhancements in this case has 
increased Cheeney's eligibility period for parole from one year 
to six years.8 Where Cheeney would have served a minimum of one 
year for the offenses without the enhancements, he is now serving 
a minimum of six years. Under the Utah scheme, imposition of the 
enhancements has increased Cheeney's incarceration six fold 
before he will be considered eligible for parole. That increase 
is significant. The "tail" is "wagging" the "dog." 
Finally, with respect to observation (6), as set forth at 
note 7, supra, the state is unable to cite to authority in 
support of the notion that "in concert" or accomplice liability 
is a factor that has always been considered to bear on punish-
ment. Observation (6) does not support the state's position. 
The state concludes its "analysis" by asserting that the six 
observations comprise the test for determining whether a sentence 
enhancement actually defines a separate offense. It reiterates 
8
 Cheeney originally asserted in the opening brief that the 
aggregate total number of minimum years of incarceration in his 
case is nine years, then amended the brief to reflect that the 
aggregate number of minimum years of incarceration is seven 
years. (Brief of Appellant, Point I.B.2. at 17.) Cheeney is mis-
taken. As the state points out, the total number of minimum years 
of incarceration is six years. This Court in Labrum I made that 
clear: the "gang enhancement increases [the] minimum term to six 
years." Labrum I, 881 P.2d at 902 n. 4. Thus, the trial court's 
language in Cheeney's case that the enhancement is imposed 
"consecutively and not concurrently" (R. 92 and 94) is incorrect. 
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that because the legislature "has the prerogative to prescribe a 
criminal offense" and has specified in § 76-3-203.1 that the 
statute "does not create any separate offense," the statute 
passes constitutional muster. (State's Brief at 18-19.) For-
tunately, McMillan does not sanction such a superficial analysis. 
For the reasons set forth in the opening brief, Cheeney 
maintains that this Court should reject the sentencing label 
placed on Section 76-3-203.1 and recognize the statute for what 
it is: an attempt to circumvent a defendant's fundamental right 
to have a jury determine traditional elements. Ramirez should be 
overruled on the grounds that it is incorrect. 
POINT III. CASES CITED IN THE STATE'S POINT II.A. SUPPORT 
THE DETERMINATION THAT § 76-3-203.1 MUST BE ESTABLISHED WITH 
PROOF THAT DEFENDANT HAD AN "IN CONCERT" MENS REA. 
As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized in State v. Alvarez that a defendant may 
be criminally responsible for an act committed by another but 
only to the extent the state has established defendant's criminal 
mental culpability. Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 461; (Brief of 
Appellant, Point II.A. at 23). In that regard, Cheeney maintains 
that unless § 76-3-203.1 is interpreted to require the state to 
prove, among other things, (1) that defendant committed the 
underlying offense and (2) that defendant had an "in-concert" or 
an accomplice mens rea, the statute is unconstitutional. The 
following scenarios illustrate Cheeney's point: 
Assume persons A and B assault victim. Defendant C may be 
criminally liable for the offense but only to the extent the 
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evidence supports that C had a criminal mens rea in connection 
with the commission of the assault. Since C was not an actor, 
his culpability may be established under § 76-2-202 with proof 
that he solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or aided in 
the assault, or under Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1995) with proof 
that he had an agreement with A and/or B to commit the assault. 
Establishing that C solicited the commission of the 
underlying offense or entered into an agreement concerning the 
offense may be sufficient to establish both a conviction on the 
offense and that C had an "in-concert" or accomplice mens rea. 
That is, he intended the commission of the offense in concert 
with two or more other persons, as set forth in Labrum III. 
On the other hand, if C is an actor and the state estab-
lishes his liability on the underlying offense, that should not 
be sufficient to also establish the "in-concert" mental 
culpability against C. The state also should be required to show 
C's accomplice liability, or that C intended the participation of 
two or more other persons for imposition of the enhancement as 
set forth in Labrum III. Hence, in addition to mandating that C 
had the required mental state for the criminal act, the state 
should be required to prove an accomplice or "in concert" mens 
rea against C. Labrum III, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37. 
Stated another way, proof that three persons each were 
liable for the offense should not be sufficient to prove "in 
concert" conduct against defendant. Such proof without more 
should only be sufficient to penalize each person individually 
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for his part in the commission of the underlying crime. 
If the state is required to prove only the independent 
mental culpability on the underlying offense and accomplice 
liability on the part of the two or more other persons to impose 
the enhancement against defendant, defendant effectively will be 
punished more harshly for the independent mental culpability of 
other persons. Cheeney maintains that Alvarez forbids such a 
result. Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 461 ("A defendant can be criminally 
responsible for an act committed by another, but the degree of 
his responsibility is determined by his own mental state") 
(citing State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 534 (Utah 1983)). 
In response to Cheeney's argument, the state asserts proof 
of an "in-concert" mental culpability is not necessary in part 
because "the circumstance in which an actor is actually unaware 
of 'in concert' participation by two or more others sufficient to 
impose the enhancement is remote." (State's Brief at 27-28.) 
Although the state fails to explain that statement, it seems to 
acknowledge that § 76-3-2 03.1 will serve to enhance a penalty 
against defendant based on proof that two or more others 
committed the offense and had accomplice liability, even though 
defendant neither intended nor was aware of the "in concert" 
participation. 
The state also asserts that § 76-3-203.1 "does not unfairly 
result in an enhanced sentence" even though it does not require 
that defendant "have knowledge of others acting in concert with 
him." (State's Brief at 27.) The state apparently relies on the 
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following cases in support of that proposition: State v. 
Lanaford, 837 P.2d at 1037, and Dixon v. State, 891 S.W.2d 59, 60 
(Ark. 1995) . Langford and Dixon do not support the state's 
position in part because they are not sentencing cases. 
Indeed, Langford and Dixon support the determination that 
based on proof of defendant's accomplice liability and proof of 
defendant's participation in the underlying offense, defendant 
may be prosecuted for a greater crime. Those cases support 
Cheeney's position. 
In Langford, the principal actor stabbed and killed another 
individual during a fistfight. The principal was charged with 
second degree murder, and the other defendants involved in the 
fight were charged as accomplices. Langford, 837 P.2d at 1037. 
The other defendants argued they could not be held liable for 
murder because they did not know the principal was armed with a 
knife. Id. at 1041. In considering the issue, the Washington 
court recognized that to sustain the murder conviction against 
the other defendants, the state was required to prove their 
involvement in the commission of the underlying offense (in that 
case the others were involved in the assault), and their 
accomplice liability. Id. 
The court reiterated that the accomplice liability statute 
premised criminal liability for the greater offense of murder "on 
the accomplice's general knowledge [that] he was assisting the 
principal in committing a crime, not upon his specific knowledge 
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of the elements of the principal's crime." Id. at 1041 (emphasis 
added); see also Dixon, 891 S.W.2d at 60. 
Contrary to the state's assertions, Langford and Dixon re-
quire both proof of defendant's involvement in commission of a 
crime, and proof that defendant assisted the principal, in order 
to sustain the conviction for the greater offense. In each case, 
the state had to prove a specific "accomplice" liability element 
against defendant to sustain the greater conviction for murder. 
Thus, defendants had the right to a jury and the state was held 
to proving such elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendants 
were entitled to all relevant constitutional guarantees before 
they could be convicted "based on the unplanned acts" of the 
principal. (State's Brief at 28.) 
The state's cases support Cheeney's argument that in order 
to impose a harsher penalty against defendant for the actions of 
others, defendant's "accomplice" mens rea must be established. 
In connection with proving such elements the state must be held 
to the reasonable-doubt standard, and defendant is entitled to 
have the issues presented to the jury as elements of the offense. 
Since Section 76-3-203.1 fails to accommodate those fundamental 
guarantees, it is unconstitutional and should be stricken. 
POINT IV. AS A FINAL MATTER, THE STATE INCORRECTLY ASSERTS 
THAT CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS RAISED BY CHEENEY ARE 
PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE SINCE CHEENEY CONDITIONALLY 
"ADMITTED" TO THE IN-CONCERT CONDUCT. 
In response to some of Cheeney's constitutional issues, the 
state has peppered its brief with claims that the issues should 
not be addressed since "[Cheeney] admitted and his counsel 
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acknowledged the ['in concert'] participation of two or more 
others (R. 125, 184[4])." (State's Brief at 28; 31 ("party lia-
bility [is not] at serious issue in this case based on defen-
dant's and defendant's counsel's acknowledgements that defendant 
acted in concert with two or more other persons"); 32-33.) 
The state in part is claiming that because Cheeney entered 
into the conditional plea agreement and conditionally admitted to 
elements of the enhancement provision, he is prevented now from 
raising certain constitutional issues on appeal. (State's Brief 
at 28, 31-33.) The state's assertions are legally incorrect. 
As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, the state 
charged Cheeney with several offenses and provided notice that 
the state would seek enhancements under § 76-3-203.1. (R. 8-12.) 
Cheeney moved to strike the statute as unconstitutional (R. 40-
48; 161-258), and the trial court rejected Cheeney's arguments. 
(R. 89-90.) In connection with the motion to strike, the state 
and Cheeney entered into a plea agreement pursuant to Rule 11(i), 
Utah R. Crim. P., and State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 
1988), wherein Cheeney pled conditionally guilty to imposition of 
the enhanced penalties in this case. (R. 27-37; 284:4-6.) In 
addition, the state agreed that Cheeney could appeal the 
constitutionality of § 76-3-203.1 to this Court. The trial court 
accepted the terms of the agreement. (R. 27-37; 284:7-8.) 
In effect, Cheeney's admissions under § 76-3-203.1 are with-
out prejudice. That is, in the event this Court reverses or 
remands imposition of the enhancements here, it would be patently 
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unfair for the state to use the conditional admissions set forth 
in the plea agreement against Cheeney. By the same token, the 
state should be precluded from relying on the admissions in 
response to Cheeney's constitutional claims on appeal. 
The state, as a party to the plea agreement, promised that 
Cheeney could raise the constitutional issues on appeal to this 
Court. The agreement serves as an acknowledgement by the parties 
that all matters argued with respect to the constitutionality of 
the gang enhancement statute are preserved and will be addressed 
on the merits without procedural posturing. 
The state cannot be allowed to stipulate and agree to this 
Court's review of the constitutionality of the statute at the 
trial court level, then claim procedural defects, i.e. standing, 
in this Court. Such an argument reflects the state's 
unwillingness to satisfy the conditions of the agreement. Cheeney 
is entitled to recision of the agreement or specific performance. 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 267 (1971) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (if government breaches plea agreement, court can 
permit recision or specific performance; defendant's preference 
should be accorded considerable, if not controlling, weight). 
Since Cheeney is seeking a merits review of the issues on appeal 
as anticipated by the parties in the trial court, Cheeney 
respectfully requests that this Court judicially enforce the plea 
agreement against the state by rejecting the procedural 
arguments. See U.S. v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 924 F.2d 928, 937 
(9th Cir. 1991) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (plea agreement is 
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judicially enforceable against government). 
With regard to the merits of the state's procedural claims, 
Cheeney has standing to challenge the constitutionality of § 76-
3-203.1. According to State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1996), 
if a litigant can show that a favorable ruling concerning the 
challenged statute will ease the litigant's injury, the litigant 
has standing to raise the constitutional issue. Id. at 1379. If 
this Court finds here that the trial court's ruling is incorrect 
and/or that § 76-3-203.1 is unconstitutional, the enhancement 
should be vacated and the matter remanded accordingly. Such a 
favorable ruling will ease the enhancements imposed in this case. 
Cheeney has standing to raise the issues on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Labrum III compels reversal of the enhancements in this case 
and remand in order that the trial court may correct an illegal 
sentence. In addition, for the reasons set forth above and more 
fully in the opening Brief, Cheeney respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the enhancements imposed against him on the 
basis that § 76-3-203.1 violates numerous federal and state 
constitutional provisions. 
SUBMITTED this 3friL day of Qu.*^. , 1998. 
Ar lAAfkfa—' 
LINDA M. JONES 
REBECCA HYDE 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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